Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pyrrho, Fraser MacBride and Michel Foucault

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


73 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting]
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Every society has a politics of truth, concerning its values, functions, prestige and mechanisms [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Marxists denounced power as class domination, but never analysed its mechanics [Foucault]
Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault]
Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton]
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]