Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pyrrho, Charles Leslie Stevenson and Ruth Barcan Marcus

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
1798 He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1800 Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6593 The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6592 Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1808 Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1802 Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1807 Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1801 Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1803 Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1806 Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1804 Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1810 Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1805 Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1809 Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23689 Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
3062 There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3063 Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]