Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Protagoras, Kurt Gdel and Augustus De Morgan

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60 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 3. Completeness of PC
Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
De Morgan started the study of relations and their properties [De Morgan, by Walicki]
De Morgan found inferences involving relations, which eluded Aristotle's syllogistic [De Morgan, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel]
The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel]
The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey]
First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P]
Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman]
Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna]
First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P]
'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg]
Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras]
There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras]
Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras]
Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras]