Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Protagoras, Jaegwon Kim and Robert C. Solomon

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151 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim]
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim]
Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim]
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras]
There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras]
Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras]
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras]
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon]
Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon]
Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon]
The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]
Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon]
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon]
Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon]
The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon]
Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon]
Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon]
The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon]
Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon]
The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras]