101 ideas
23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
1553 | No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras] |
2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
16473 | Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker] |
19258 | Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya] |
2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23029 | Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
1545 | Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius] |
1547 | Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras] |
3305 | There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3313 | If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
3317 | You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras] |
247 | God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras] |
606 | Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
612 | Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras] |
2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
14739 | 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider] |
13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
23035 | The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH] |
23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
6016 | Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD] |
23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
1580 | For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik] |
205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
23046 | States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH] |
23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23037 | People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH] |
23051 | Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH] |
23043 | All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH] |
23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23028 | The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23054 | Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23047 | Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23042 | National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23048 | The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23049 | Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH] |
1659 | Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos] |
532 | Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras] |
1552 | He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily] |
23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |
1551 | He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras] |