66 ideas
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
| 4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |
| 4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
| 4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
| 4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
| 4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
| 4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
| 4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
| 4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
| 3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
| 3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
| 4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
| 3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
| 3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
| 3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
| 3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
| 4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
| 4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
| 4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
| 4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
| 4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
| 4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
| 4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
| 4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
| 4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
| 4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
| 4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
| 4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
| 4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
| 4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
| 4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
| 4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
| 4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
| 4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
| 4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
| 4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
| 4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
| 4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
| 4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
| 4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
| 4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
| 4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |