74 ideas
18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
8386 | Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
8387 | A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
8384 | The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane] |
18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |