Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Porphyry, Michael Smith and David-Hillel Ruben

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry]
Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry]
Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]