152 ideas
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
| 14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
| 23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
| 19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
| 20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
| 20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
| 23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
| 23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
| 23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
| 23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
| 23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
| 23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
| 20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
| 20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
| 20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| 23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
| 20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
| 20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
| 20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
| 20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
| 20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
| 20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
| 20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
| 20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
| 20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| 23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
| 23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
| 20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
| 23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
| 23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
| 20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
| 20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| 23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| 23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
| 20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
| 20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
| 20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
| 23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
| 23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
| 20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
| 20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
| 23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
| 23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
| 23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
| 23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
| 23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
| 23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
| 23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
| 23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
| 23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| 23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
| 23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
| 20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
| 23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
| 23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
| 23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |