Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Porphyry, Jeff McMahan and Jonathan Schaffer

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99 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry]
Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry]
Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan]
A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan]
A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan]
You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan]
Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan]
Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan]
Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan]
The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan]
If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan]
If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan]
Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan]
If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan]
If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan]
Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan]
Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]