48 ideas
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 8964 | Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8961 | Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| 11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 8963 | Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| 11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |