Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Porphyry, Hilary Putnam and Baruch de Spinoza

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380 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza]
If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza]
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza]
In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is its own standard [Spinoza]
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
'⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro]
V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza]
The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam]
We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza]
The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza]
Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza]
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza]
You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza]
A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza]
The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza]
Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza]
As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza]
The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza]
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza]
An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza]
'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza]
Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza]
The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza]
The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza]
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza]
An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza]
Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza]
An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam]
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza]
Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza]
We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza]
We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza]
Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza]
The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza]
All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry]
Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry]
Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza]
Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza]
Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza]
People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza]
A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza]
The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson]
The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza]
Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza]
Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza]
Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza]
Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza]
Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza]
People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza]
Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza]
In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza]
No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza]
Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza]
The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza]
God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza]
God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley]
God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K]
God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza]
God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza]
God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza]
God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord]
Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza]
God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord]
God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza]
Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza]
Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry]
That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza]
The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza]
God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza]
Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]