104 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |