131 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
12189 | Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
3802 | Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
3795 | Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
6624 | Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
3796 | The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
23803 | States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte] |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
3804 | Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett] |
18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |