164 ideas
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 6779 | Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
| 10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
| 13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
| 10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
| 10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| 9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
| 10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
| 10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
| 9226 | If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H] |
| 8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
| 8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
| 18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
| 10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
| 18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
| 9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
| 18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
| 18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
| 18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
| 8714 | Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H] |
| 18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| 6780 | Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird] |
| 18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| 8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| 6796 | Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird] |
| 6797 | Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird] |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| 6800 | Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird] |
| 6786 | As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 6792 | If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird] |
| 6757 | Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird] |
| 6777 | Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird] |
| 6804 | There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird] |
| 6805 | Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird] |
| 6778 | Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 6775 | Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird] |
| 6791 | If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird] |
| 6790 | Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird] |
| 6738 | Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird] |
| 6739 | Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird] |
| 6799 | We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird] |
| 6798 | Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird] |
| 6752 | The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird] |
| 6754 | We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird] |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| 6750 | Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird] |
| 18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
| 6761 | Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird] |
| 6758 | 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird] |
| 6759 | Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird] |
| 6756 | Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird] |
| 6760 | An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird] |
| 6785 | Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird] |
| 6788 | Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird] |
| 6787 | Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird] |
| 6751 | Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird] |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| 17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| 10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
| 9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
| 22244 | 'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati] |
| 7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| 6776 | Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird] |
| 6767 | Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird] |
| 6768 | Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird] |
| 6770 | Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird] |
| 6771 | Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird] |
| 6773 | If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird] |
| 6769 | In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird] |
| 6774 | Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird] |
| 6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
| 6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
| 6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
| 8404 | Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H] |
| 17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| 8401 | Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H] |
| 8400 | Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H] |
| 8402 | The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H] |
| 6753 | Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird] |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| 17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
| 6762 | Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird] |
| 6763 | Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird] |
| 6772 | Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird] |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| 6740 | 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird] |
| 6741 | There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird] |
| 6742 | A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird] |
| 6743 | If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird] |
| 6744 | Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird] |
| 6747 | Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird] |
| 6746 | There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird] |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| 6748 | Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird] |
| 6749 | We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird] |
| 6803 | If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird] |
| 6801 | Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird] |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| 6745 | A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird] |
| 6802 | With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 6789 | If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| 18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
| 6807 | In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird] |
| 18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
| 18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |