Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pittacus, Jonathan Kvanvig and Paul Thagard

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard]
Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard]
Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard]