Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pittacus, C. Anthony Anderson and Stuart Glennan

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
3016 Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17488 Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17493 Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
17487 Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
17489 Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17490 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
17491 Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
17494 Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]