15 ideas
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
| 6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |