41 ideas
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
13520 | A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS] |
13524 | Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS] |
13521 | Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS] |
13522 | Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS] |
13523 | Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
13529 | Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS] |
13526 | Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS] |
13534 | In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS] |
13535 | First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS] |
13519 | Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS] |
13531 | Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS] |
13532 | Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS] |
13533 | First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS] |
13537 | An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS] |
13539 | The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS] |
13538 | If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS] |
13525 | Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS] |
13530 | An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS] |
13518 | Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |