20 ideas
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
6017 | Nomos is king [Pindar] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |