Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pindar, Kenneth Kunen and Stephen S. Colvin

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
An 'equivalence' relation is one which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive [Kunen]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]