Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pindar, John Perry and Ernst Zermelo

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44 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo]
Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg]
Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo]
Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara]
For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn]
Zermelo showed that the ZF axioms in 1930 were non-categorical [Zermelo, by Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement was added when some advanced theorems seemed to need it [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The antinomy of endless advance and of completion is resolved in well-ordered transfinite numbers [Zermelo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / e. Countable infinity
Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]