39 ideas
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
14508 | A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM] |
14511 | There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM] |
16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
12031 | Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
12034 | If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM] |
14510 | Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM] |
16455 | Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
16451 | Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11901 | Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P] |
14512 | Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |
22511 | Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus] |
1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |