Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philodemus, William James and Kent Bach

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73 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
A single explanation must have a single point of view [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James]
New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James]
True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James]
Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
Private experience is the main evidence for God [James]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James]