176 ideas
22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |