Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philodemus, Robert Nozick and James Robert Brown

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57 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR]
When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR]
For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR]
Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR]
The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick]
Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick]
How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick]
Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR]