Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Philodemus, Jos A. Benardete and Henry Laycock

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]