164 ideas
21916 | Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer] |
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
21924 | As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer] |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
21915 | To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer] |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |