120 ideas
| 13773 | For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates] |
| 343 | The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates] |
| 7421 | A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault] |
| 1649 | Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 5842 | Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 648 | Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 164 | It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates] |
| 1647 | In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 115 | Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates] |
| 22099 | The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle] |
| 5844 | Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 11389 | Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 639 | Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 1652 | Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 23252 | Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
| 14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
| 5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
| 195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
| 1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
| 5839 | For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5867 | For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5069 | Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5836 | All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5840 | The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 185 | Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato] |
| 5070 | Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5838 | A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 344 | If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates] |
| 339 | Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates] |
| 5837 | Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 3017 | The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1646 | Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos] |
| 2 | We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates] |
| 1663 | By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 345 | A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates] |
| 4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
| 8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
| 126 | We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates] |
| 4111 | Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B] |
| 7808 | Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling] |
| 346 | One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates] |
| 23907 | Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 341 | Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates] |
| 7585 | Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard] |
| 5841 | Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 347 | Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates] |
| 1661 | Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5846 | A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1657 | Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 1662 | A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 338 | Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato] |
| 5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |