Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pherecydes, Keith Campbell and Mark Sainsbury

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10429 It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
8983 If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
8986 We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8982 Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
8984 If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
8985 Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10434 Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
10431 Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
22745 Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5883 Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]