32 ideas
| 12036 | Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas] |
| 12046 | Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas] |
| 4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
| 4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
| 12037 | Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas] |
| 3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
| 3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
| 12040 | Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas] |
| 3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| 3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
| 3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
| 3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
| 22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |