163 ideas
| 19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| 19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
| 19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
| 19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
| 21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
| 19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
| 19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
| 14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
| 19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
| 14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
| 19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
| 19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
| 19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
| 21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
| 14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
| 19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
| 10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
| 21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| 19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
| 14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
| 14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
| 14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
| 14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
| 14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
| 14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
| 14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
| 14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
| 19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
| 19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
| 19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
| 19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
| 19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
| 14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
| 14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
| 19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
| 19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
| 14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
| 19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
| 19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
| 19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
| 14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
| 19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
| 19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
| 19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
| 22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
| 22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
| 14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
| 19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| 7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
| 22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| 19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
| 22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
| 19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
| 5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |