29 ideas
| 13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
| 17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
| 9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
| 11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
| 22745 | Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
| 5883 | Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero] |