Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pherecydes, Clive Bell and Frank Jackson

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Good art produces exaltation and detachment [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beauty' leads to confusion, because it denotes distinct emotions [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Our feeling for natural beauty is different from the aesthetic emotion of art [Bell,C]
We only see landscapes as artistic if we ignore their instrumental value [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Visual form can create a sublime mental state [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art is the expression of an emotion for ultimate reality [Bell,C]
Aestheticism invites artist to create beauty, but with no indication of how to do it [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Only artists can discern significant form; other people must look to art to find it [Bell,C, by Gardner]
Maybe significant form gives us a feeling for ultimate reality [Bell,C]
Significant form is the essence of art, which I believe expresses an emotion about reality [Bell,C]
'Form' is visual relations, and it is 'significant' if it moves us aesthetically; art needs both [Bell,C, by Feagin]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
The only expression art could have is the emotion resulting from pure form [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
Mere copies of pictures are not significant - unless the copies are very exact [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Art is distinguished by its aesthetic emotion, which produces appropriate form [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Aesthetic contemplation is the best and most intense mental state [Bell,C]
Aesthetic experience is an exaltation which increases the possibilities of life [Bell,C]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Only artistic qualities matter in art, because they also have the highest moral value [Bell,C]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion sees infinite value in some things, and irrelevance in the rest [Bell,C]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]