Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Pherecydes, Chris Swoyer and Neil E. Williams

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE]
A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE]
Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE]
Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE]
Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Pherecydes said the first principle and element is earth [Pherecydes, by Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE]
Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Pherecydes was the first to say that the soul is eternal [Pherecydes, by Cicero]