471 ideas
7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
22312 | Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |