1011 ideas
| 12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
| 19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| 19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| 2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
| 19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
| 16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
| 13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 21461 | I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis] |
| 16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
| 5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| 16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
| 19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
| 3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
| 2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
| 3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
| 2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
| 19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
| 8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| 19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
| 19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
| 10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
| 9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
| 13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| 16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
| 10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
| 15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
| 15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
| 15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
| 15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
| 15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
| 15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
| 10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
| 10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
| 10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
| 15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
| 15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
| 15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
| 10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
| 10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
| 15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
| 15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
| 10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
| 15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
| 15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
| 15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
| 10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
| 10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
| 15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
| 15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
| 15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
| 15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| 13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
| 9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
| 19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
| 13190 | I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz] |
| 19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
| 10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
| 15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
| 15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
| 15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
| 10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
| 15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
| 15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
| 15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
| 14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
| 12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| 5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
| 19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
| 15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
| 15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
| 15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
| 15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
| 15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
| 15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| 3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
| 12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
| 9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
| 3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| 16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
| 19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
| 7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
| 12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
| 12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
| 5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
| 19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
| 19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
| 12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
| 12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
| 12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
| 7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
| 11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
| 12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
| 19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
| 19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
| 15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
| 12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
| 12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
| 13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
| 13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
| 12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| 8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
| 16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
| 9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
| 9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
| 15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
| 13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
| 19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
| 21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
| 15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| 15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
| 9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
| 15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
| 15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
| 15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| 15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
| 15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| 14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
| 15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
| 15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
| 15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
| 16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
| 15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| 15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| 15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
| 15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
| 10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| 4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| 15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
| 15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
| 15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
| 15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
| 9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
| 16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
| 9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
| 15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
| 15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
| 12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
| 12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
| 12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
| 12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
| 13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
| 12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
| 12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
| 12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
| 12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
| 12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
| 12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| 15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| 15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
| 15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| 15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| 19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
| 15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
| 15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
| 13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
| 16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
| 12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
| 12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
| 12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
| 12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
| 13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
| 12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
| 19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
| 12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
| 12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
| 12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
| 12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
| 13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
| 7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
| 13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
| 13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
| 7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
| 15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
| 15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
| 15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
| 15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
| 15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
| 15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
| 15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
| 15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
| 15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
| 16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
| 15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
| 14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
| 6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
| 15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
| 15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
| 15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
| 10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
| 9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
| 13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
| 15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
| 14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
| 10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
| 10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
| 13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
| 13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
| 13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
| 12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
| 13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
| 13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
| 13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
| 13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
| 11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
| 12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
| 11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
| 9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
| 14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
| 9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
| 19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
| 15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
| 15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
| 16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
| 19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
| 19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
| 17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
| 12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
| 16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
| 13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
| 14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
| 8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
| 12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
| 12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
| 9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
| 13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
| 15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
| 18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
| 7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| 19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
| 9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
| 16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
| 12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
| 9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
| 15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
| 10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
| 11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
| 5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
| 5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
| 16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
| 15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
| 9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
| 19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
| 12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
| 19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| 12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
| 12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
| 5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| 19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
| 19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
| 19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
| 12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
| 19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
| 5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
| 5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
| 5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
| 19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
| 12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
| 19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
| 12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
| 12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
| 9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
| 19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| 13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
| 12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
| 13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
| 13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
| 3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| 19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
| 2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
| 8209 | Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis] |
| 15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
| 19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
| 5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| 19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
| 19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| 7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
| 5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
| 12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
| 5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
| 7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
| 19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
| 19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
| 7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
| 3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
| 7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| 3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
| 7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
| 19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
| 19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
| 13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
| 8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
| 8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
| 8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
| 8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
| 8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
| 8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
| 8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
| 8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
| 15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
| 16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
| 16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| 15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
| 19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
| 12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
| 5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
| 7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
| 19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
| 19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
| 12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
| 5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| 7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
| 19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
| 19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
| 19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
| 12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
| 2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
| 15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
| 19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| 2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
| 7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
| 19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
| 19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
| 16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| 15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| 9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
| 2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
| 12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
| 12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| 9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
| 9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
| 9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
| 9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
| 9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
| 12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
| 11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
| 13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| 4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
| 12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |
| 19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| 12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
| 15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
| 12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
| 12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
| 13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
| 13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
| 16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |
| 20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
| 13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
| 2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
| 19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
| 2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
| 12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
| 2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
| 22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
| 23019 | The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
| 23021 | Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| 19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
| 5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| 22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
| 19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
| 19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
| 3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
| 2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
| 2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
| 2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
| 19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
| 2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
| 19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
| 19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
| 12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
| 12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
| 5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
| 19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |
| 7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
| 12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
| 12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |
| 12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
| 13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
| 19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
| 19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |