Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for PG, Gilbert Ryle and David Wiggins

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320 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
Aletheia: truth [PG]
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
Ananke: necessity [PG]
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
Chronismos: separation [PG]
Diairesis: division [PG]
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
Diaphora: difference [PG]
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
Empeiron: experience [PG]
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
Enkrateia: control [PG]
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
Ergon: function [PG]
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
Eros: love [PG]
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
Genos: type, genus [PG]
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
Horismos: definition [PG]
Hule: matter [PG]
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
Meson: the mean [PG]
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
Morphe: form [PG]
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
Orexis: desire [PG]
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
Philia: friendship [PG]
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
Physis: nature [PG]
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
Theos: god [PG]
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
To ti estin: essence [PG]
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
347: death of Plato [PG]
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naďve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]