Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Novalis, Shaughan Lavine and Michael Potter

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96 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Second-order set theory just adds a version of Replacement that quantifies over functions [Lavine]
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
An 'upper bound' is the greatest member of a subset; there may be several of these, so there is a 'least' one [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
Collections of things can't be too big, but collections by a rule seem unlimited in size [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Those who reject infinite collections also want to reject the Axiom of Choice [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
The Power Set is just the collection of functions from one collection to another [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement was immediately accepted, despite having very few implications [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Foundation says descending chains are of finite length, blocking circularity, or ungrounded sets [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Pure collections of things obey Choice, but collections defined by a rule may not [Lavine]
The controversy was not about the Axiom of Choice, but about functions as arbitrary, or given by rules [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
The 'logical' notion of class has some kind of definition or rule to characterise the class [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception of set wasn't suggested until 1947 [Lavine]
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
The iterative conception needs the Axiom of Infinity, to show how far we can iterate [Lavine]
The iterative conception doesn't unify the axioms, and has had little impact on mathematical proofs [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
Limitation of Size: if it's the same size as a set, it's a set; it uses Replacement [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
A collection is 'well-ordered' if there is a least element, and all of its successors can be identified [Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
Second-order logic presupposes a set of relations already fixed by the first-order domain [Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Mathematical proof by contradiction needs the law of excluded middle [Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is nowadays (thanks to set theory) regarded as the study of structure, not of quantity [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Every rational number, unlike every natural number, is divisible by some other number [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
For the real numbers to form a set, we need the Continuum Hypothesis to be true [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Cauchy gave a necessary condition for the convergence of a sequence [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
The two sides of the Cut are, roughly, the bounding commensurable ratios [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
Counting results in well-ordering, and well-ordering makes counting possible [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
The theory of infinity must rest on our inability to distinguish between very large sizes [Lavine]
The infinite is extrapolation from the experience of indefinitely large size [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
The intuitionist endorses only the potential infinite [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
'Aleph-0' is cardinality of the naturals, 'aleph-1' the next cardinal, 'aleph-ω' the ω-th cardinal [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Ordinals are basic to Cantor's transfinite, to count the sets [Lavine]
Paradox: the class of all ordinals is well-ordered, so must have an ordinal as type - giving a bigger ordinal [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Paradox: there is no largest cardinal, but the class of everything seems to be the largest [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory will found all of mathematics - except for the notion of proof [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Modern mathematics works up to isomorphism, and doesn't care what things 'really are' [Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism rejects set-theory to found mathematics [Lavine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Every person has his own language [Novalis]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis]