Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A, G.E. Moore and Zeno (Elea)

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius]