Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Thomas Reid and Edmund Husserl

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117 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]