Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Richard Cartwright and Keith T. Maslin

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
3523 Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
3517 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
3538 Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
3540 If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3518 I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3530 Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3520 Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3528 Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
3525 Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin]
3527 Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin]