38 ideas
| 17596 | Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard] |
| 17597 | Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard] |
| 17598 | Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard] |
| 17602 | Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard] |
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| 12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
| 12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
| 12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
| 17601 | Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard] |
| 17600 | Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard] |
| 17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17599 | The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard] |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |