Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Leslie H. Tharp and Gabriel M.A. Segal

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10775 The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
10766 Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10767 Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10769 Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
10762 In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10776 The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
10774 There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10777 Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp]
10773 The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
10765 Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10763 Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
10770 If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10771 Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp]
10772 Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
10764 A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp]
10768 Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]