12 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
16700 | In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff] |
16701 | To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |