Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, Jean-Paul Sartre and S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum

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105 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum]
Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum]
The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Man IS freedom [Sartre]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre]
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre]
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
There is no human nature [Sartre]
Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre]
Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre]
'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre]
Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre]
Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle]
Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre]
When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum]
Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre]