Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, George Molnar and Blaise Pascal

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
It is not good to be too free [Pascal]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking]
Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal]
The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal]
If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal]