15 ideas
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
| 3031 | The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius] |