Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, David Liggins and Daniel Statman

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23 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
14231 We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14233 Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
7096 We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
7098 There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
7099 With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
7100 Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
7102 Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
7095 Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
7094 Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
7093 Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
7104 The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
7103 Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]