Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Menedemus, C.D. Broad and Ian McFetridge

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20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14759 A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
11842 If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
14963 Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3031 The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
8160 The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
14609 We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22933 We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]